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TOWARDS AN AFRICAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
STRUCTURING AND THE COURT

VINCENT O. ORLU NMEHIELLE *

I.

INTRODUCTION

African human rights discourse assumed a new dimension 1 with the
adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the
Charter) in Nairobi in 1981 by the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government (AHSG) of the Organization of Mrican Unity (OAU). The
Charter was born out of the conviction of the Mrican States of the need
for a home-grown regional human rights commitment in light of
international standards laid down by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, other subsequent norm-creating international human rights
instruments, and the experience of other regions. Further, the Mrican
states, which had long been preoccupied with their struggles against
colonial domination, realized that after more than two decades of the end
of de jure colonialism, a need existed to organize for the protection of the
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Nigeria);B.L. 1990 (Nigeria), Barrister and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, LL.M., 1996,
(University of Notre Dame Law School, Notre Dame, Indiana); Doctor of Juridical Science (S.1.D.)
Candidate, (The George Washington University Law School, Washington, D.C., U.S.A.).
1.
Before this time, human rights discourse in Africa centered on the condemnation of
African colonialism and the terrible practice of apartheid in South Africa.
27
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rights of African people against violations by their own home
governments. 2
While these assertions may provide some of the underlying reasons for
the promulgation of the Charter, the state of human rights in many
African countries at that time was problematic. Totalitarianism was in
the air, either in the form of military governments or party-dominated
autocracies. This threat created much of the regional and international
outcry, as well as a need for action.
When the Charter came into force in 1986, many commentators viewed
the document as unique, impressive in its elaborate provisions, and
ground breaking in such progressive provisions as "Peoples' rights" and
the incorporation of economic, social and cultural rights. Yet analysis
has since shown that the mechanism for the protection and enforcement
of .human rights under the Charter is not effective. The African
Commission (the Commission) created under the Charter with the
responsibility of giving effect to its provisions lacks the necessary
effective authority to carry out its mandate. The lack of provision for a
judicial organ, in this case, a court, compounds the problem of the
weakness of the entire system.
The purpose of this paper is to argue the need for an African Court of
Human Rights if African states truly wish to maintain an African human
rights mechanism. In other words, for an effective African regional
human rights protection and enforcement mechanism to exist, the
African system must be made more effective and supplemented with a
court of human rights. The propsal for an African Court of Human
Rights will require an amendment of the Charter by a treaty or
convention. Recent human rights violations include those that took place
in Nigeria, in former Zaire under Mobutu Seseko, and the carnage and
genocide in Rwanda.
This paper is divided into four sections. Section one offers a brief
evaluation of the current system, with the aim of pointing out its inherent
weaknesses and possible means to strengthen it. .This necessarily
involves an evaluation of the Commission and the effectiveness of its
mandate as a remedy for human rights violations. Section two builds on

2.
For example, the oppressive regimes of Idi Amin's Uganda, Bokasa's Central African
Empire, and Nguema's Equatorial Guinea, just to mention a few, were viewed internationally as
paradigmatic of African leadership. The continent's leadership needed to reclaim international
legitimacy and salvage its image.
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the previous section to present arguments in favor of a court. Section
three suggests a structure for the court in terms of composition, basic
foundation, and its relationship with the Commission. Finally, section
four focuses on how to empower the court in terms of jurisdiction,
independence, enforcement of its decisions, and funding.
The author will draw inspiration from existing international and regional
mechanisms/ as well as current initiatives in the African region. 4 The
author will comment on and make use of the Draft Protocol to the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights already in place,
considering it as a possible treaty or convention-based amendment to the
African Charter.

n.

BRIEF EV ALUA TION OF THE PRESENT AFRICAN HUMAN
RIGHTS

This section will evaluate and analyze some aspects of the mechanism
bordering on some substantive provisions of the Charter affecting the
African Commission. These are provisions that tend to clog the effective
realization of the mandate created by the entire mechanism, particularly,
the mandate of the Commission and the remedy inherent in the exercise
of this mandate. This section will not recount the history of the African
Charter, nor is it intended to describe the process of the mechanism
established by the Charter in general.
A.

THE AFRICAN COMMISSION

Under Article 30 of the African Charter, the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights was established as the implementing
institution of the Charter, with the basic mandate to "promote Human and
Peoples' Rights and to ensure their protection in Africa.,,5 The contents
of this promotional function were elaborated and emphasized in Article

3. While the African system may not duplicate the Inter-American and European systems, it
will be very useful to draw from their experiences and evolution.
4.
Such an initiative is the meeting of "government experts on the question of the creation of
an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights" held in Cape Town, South Africa from September
6 - 12, 1995, under the auspices of the International Commission of Jurists and the OAU by virtue of
its Resolution AHG/230(XXX) at the Tunis Summit in June 1994 (in which the Secretary General of
the OAU was invited to summon experts to meet on the establishment of an African Court for
Human Rights). This meeting was held in collaboration with the South African Ministry of Justice.
The meeting came up with a proposed Draft Protocol to the African Charter on the establishment of
an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights.
5. For the general provisions on the Charter and its composition, see Articles 30 - 44. These
provisions deal with the basic administrative set-up of the Commission.
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45 dealing with the mandate of the Commission .. This mandate ranges
from collection of documents, organizing conferences and seminars,
formulation of legal principles and rules aimed at the solution of legal
problems relating to human rights, collaboration with state parties and
the like. The basic question here is, why is the mandate of the
commission centered on promotional activities rather than on protection
and enforcement? There is, no doubt, great need for promotional
activities especially in the African system. Should promotion, no matter
how important, take over the place of protection and enforcement? The
usual answer to the above questions is that at the time the African
Charter was adopted, member states were not prepared to accept
anything not contained in the Charter.6 In other words, the Charter was a
compromise document not meant to be very effective, nor was the
Commission, its implementing institution. As such, the Charter was not
intended to go too far in guaranteeing human rights at the African
regional level.
It may be argued that given the fact that the Charter was ratified by many
member states, it was not intended to go very far. Thus, many states
were prepared to ratify it so long as the Charter did not impose heavy
burdens. It has been suggested, and rightly so, that one of the key
purposes of any human rights instrument is the control of state action. 7 It
is also certain that the object and purpose of the Charter is the protection
of human rights in accordance with international standards rather than a
particular African standard. However, the Charter was not given the
power to do these tasks because of the lack of an effective enforcement
machinery under it. According to Claude E. Welch Jr., "beyond the
official prose of the Charter, the program of action, and the guidelines for
national periodic reports, the current situation is far from satisfactory.,,8
In the opinion of this author, the Charter was, at least in spirit, an
ineffective compromise.

6.
This view is often attributed to Judge Keba Mbaye, the "father" and principal author of the
African Charter, who said, "we have already highlighted the inadequacies of the norms conceived
and elaborated in the Charter. The criticisms that have been made about the prospect are perhaps too
harsh. We must remember that in 1981, the year in which the African Charter was adopted, Africa
was not prepared to accept, either materially or institutionally, anything that was not contained in the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights." See specifically, the Address by Adama Dieng,
Secretary General for the International Commission of Jurists at the meeting of government experts
on the question of the creation of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights held in Cape
Town, South Africa on September 6 - 12, 1995, in which he quoted Judge Keba Mbaye.
7.
Makau Mutua, The African Human Rights System In a Comparative Perspective: The Need
for Urgent Reformulation 5 LEGAL FELLOW 31 (1993).
8.
Claude E. Welch, Jr., The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Five
Year Report and Assessment 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 42 at 53 (1992). WeIch, however, is of the view that
the situation is not as serious as the Commission's most severe critics allege.
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Nevertheless, on balance, it appears that the Charter is a limited
document. It is important to point out the inherent weakness in the entire
mechanism through a treaty-based amendment. This in tum amounts to a
correction of these weaknesses based on treaty law, rather than on
judicial or quasi-judicial pronouncements. One of these weaknesses
which affects the Commission is the political control which Assembly of
Heads of State and Government of the OAU exercises over it. The
Commission is made dependent on the political control of the Assembly
of Heads of State and Government, which, of course, is composed of
member states whose actions the Commission is set up to consider.
One basic problem presented by this control is the lack of publicity given
to the Commission's work. Article 59 of the Charter, which deals with
the Commission's procedure, provides that "all measures taken within
the provisions of the present Charter shall remain confidential until such
a time as the Assembly of Heads of State and Government [AHSG] shall
otherwise decide." The Commission interprets this to mean that it
cannot mention the cases, nor the countries complained against, nor the
stages reached in individual cases.9 Further, the Commission cannot
even publish its report, as indicated by subsection 2 of Article 59. Under
section 59(2) the chairman of the Commission can only publish the
Commission's report on the decision of the AHSG. From the inception
of the African System, the AHSG has not readily authorized the
publication of any report of the Commission until recently. This lack of
publicity has given a wide impression that the communication procedure
of the Commission cannot be relied upon by potential petitioners, 10
resulting in few communications addressed to the Commission.
What effect will a human rights mechanism have if the freedom to make
its activities public is removed? The effect of publicity in the field of
human rights protection cannot be overemphasized. Other international
procedures encourage the pUblication of reports and activities of the
systems under which they are set up. The successes of the Inter
American and European systems were largely achieved by the freedom
they enjoyed to publicize their activities. Reports of the European
Commission are published in nearly all cases by the Committee of
Ministers,11 while the Inter American Commission decides on its own, by
virtue of article 51(3) of the American Conventi?n, Human Rights,

9.
Wolfgang Benedek, The African Charter and Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights;
How to Make it More Effective, I NETH. Q.H.R. 25 at 29 (1993).
10.

11.

[d.
[d.; European Convention on Human Rights, art. 32(3).
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decides whether to publish its report. Thus, it is desirable for the Charter
to mandate the Commission to publish its reports in cases that come
before it.
Second, the Commission lacks adequate resources, equipment, and
support to make it truly effective. The serious financial problems of the
OAD affect the Commission, and have prevented it from operating at its
full capacity. There is no doubt that the OAD is in financial crisis, due to
the poverty of the majority of its member states who cannot and do not
live up to their financial obligations. One example of the dearth of
financial resources is the failure to construct the planned information and
documentation center. Yet there have been increasing human rights
violations in Africa, and thus, more need for the Commission to be able
to do the work it is set up to do. The hope is that member states will
endeavor to make the Commission more financially viable. There is also
a need for more international financial support for the Commission if the
international outcry against the terrible human rights situation in Africa
is sincere. This will enhance the gains already made by the international
assistance already extended to the Commission, mainly from the
European Community and the DN Voluntary Fund for Advisory
Services. 12
Finally, from its beginning, a weakness of the Commission has been the
lack of activist conviction of its members, especially, the initial
Commissioners, since members of the Commission were not interested in
judicial . activism aimed at developing the jurisprudence of the
Commission. Despite the evasive nature of the mandate of the
Commission in the Charter, there are ample provisions upon which the
Commission can rely to serve the purposes of human rights protection .
and even enforcement. Since the Commission has the mandate of
drawing up its rules of procedure,13 it could use that measure to assert
some level of independence in construing the Charter.
The Commission also has the power under article 45(1)b to formulate
principles and rules aimed at the solution of legal problems relating to
human rights and fundamental freedom upon which the African
Governments may base legislation. Article 60 gives the Commission the
power to draW "inspiration from international laws ... " while Article 61
allows it "to take into consideration, as subsidiary measures to determine

12. See Welch, supra note 8, at 54. It is estimated that each of these bodies has committed
approximately $200,000 to the purse of the Commission.
13. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 42(2).
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the principles of law, other general or special international conventions,
laying down rules expressly recognized by member states of the
Organization of African Unity, African practices consistent with
international norms on human rights, customs generally accepted as law,
general principles of law recognized by African states as well as
jurisprudence and legal doctrine." The combined effect of these
provisions, it can be argued, is the power to apply international standards
in Commission deliberations.
Thus, the Commission could use
innovation to realize what it was expressly or impliedly denied in the
Charter.
Critics of the Commission argue that the Commissioners have been
unwilling to use these windows of opportunity for a number of reasons,
including their close relationships to the African states. 14 Many of the
commissioners were or still are prominent officials in their states of
ongm, which makes it difficult for such individuals to act
independently. 15
Recent activities of the commissioners, however, suggest the willingness
of the Commission to be more progressive in interpreting the Charter and
using its powers under it. The Commission now appears willing, for
example, to circumvent the restrictive provisions of Rule 32 of its
procedure endorsing in camera sittings and sessions of the
Commission. 16 Scholars of African Human Rights 17 note the following
as reasons for the shift in practice: (1) the increased self-confidence the
Commission has gained over time, (2) the growing number of qualified
observers such as international non-governmental agencies, and (3)
recognition of the need that the work of the Commission be understood
and supported by the public in order to be effective.
The Commission has also started trying to circumvent the confidentiality
feature of the Charter under Article 59 which has brought the efficacy of

14. Mutua, supra note 7, at 34
15. Id., Examples of such membership in the Commission are two former Commissioners,
Moleki D. Mokama and Alexis Gabou, who during their term of office on the Commission, also
served as Attorney General and Minister of Interior of Botswana and Congo, respectively. See
specifically, EVELYN A. ANKUMA, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEoPLES' RIGHTS:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 18 (The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996).
Infra note 18.
16. In its ninth session in Lagos, Nigeria in March, 1991 the Commission allowed observers to
view all meetings except those dealing with protection activities and the report to the OAU. The
Commission has also recently undertaken visits to some member countries to review the human
rights situation in those countries, the most recent being the visit by a delegation of the Commission
to Nigeria, on the invitation of the government in March, 1996.
17. Welch, supra note 8 at 54.
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the Charter into question. In an attempt to publicize the Commission's
activities, in 1991, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) attending
the Commission's session and working with the Commission, established
an NGO register under the supervision of the International Commission
of Jurists. Under this system, individuals, NGOs, and others who have
submitted complaints to the Commission are to record their complaints
and any information received by the Commission on the status of the
complaint in the register. IS This system, which is supposed to make the
activities of the Commission accessible, regrettably has not been made
much use of by many NGOS.1 9 The Commission also distributes its Final
Communique, issued at the end of each Ordinary Session, as well as
press releases and its Annual Activity Report, which becomes a public
document after its adoption by the AHSG. 2o
While these attempts at publicity are commendable, the Commission still
maintains a restrictive interpretation of the confidentiality provision of
the Charter on its activities. The Commission does not publish the
method by which it reaches its decisions on admissibility and the
substantive rights in the Charter. 21 In other words, apart from its Final
Communique, press releases, Annual Activity Report and the "Review of
the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights", there is no
publication of the deliberation and reasoned decision of cases by the
Commission.
Thus, it must be said that there is still a lack of full confidence on the
part of the Commissioners to explore the Commission's hidden powers,
as discussed earlier. There needs to be a major reformulation of the
African Charter to incorporate express powers to the Commission in light
of the needs of the human rights environment in Africa. There is no
doubt that an express provision of law is better than implied authority, at
least for the purpose of providing effective remedies.
B.

REMEDY UNDER THE CHARTER

Even if the commission concludes that there has been a violation of
rights, what effective remedy does the African Charter provide for? In

18.
EVELYN A. ANKUMA, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 39 (The Hague, The Netherlands: Maninus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996).

19. Id.
20. Id. The Seventh Activity Report of the Commission, considered by the ASHG at its 30th
session in Tunis in 1994 and published by the OAU, went a step further in disclosing the status of
the cases submitted to the Commission.
21. Id. at 77.
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fact, the Charter does not offer significant remedies. Article 58 of the
Charter provides:
(1) When it appears after deliberations of the Commission that
one or more exceptional situations apparently reveal the existence of a series of serious or massive violations of human and
Peoples' rights, the Commission shall draw the attention of the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government to them.
(2) The Assembly of Heads of State and Government may then
request the Commission to undertake an in-depth study of these
situations and make a factual report, accompanied by its findings
and recommendations.
(3) A case of emergency duly noticed by the Commission shall
be submitted by the latter to the Chairman of the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government who may request in-depth study.
One must agree with Wolfgang 22 on his comment about these provisions.
According to him, there is a distinction between the remedy available in
ordinary cases of violations and special cases of violations. He opines
that while there appears to be a remedy in special cases, there is no
remedy in ordinary cases of violation. Special cases are those involving
the existence of serious or massive violations of human and Peoples'
rights. Thus, whether a remedy is available or not is dependent on
whether the act complained of is a serious and massive violation of
human rights or requires emergency action, or is an ordinary abuse of
human rights. The remedy, whether there is an ordinary abuse or a
special or emergency case, is in-depth study after the Commission either
makes factual reports to the AHSG or draws the AHSG's attention to
them.
What remedy, if any, does in-depth study or recommendation provide?
The Assembly of Heads of States and Governments is not a body that is
in session all year round, nor does the Commission have the power to
summon such assembly. The AHSG has not been known to order an indepth study as suggested by Article 58. Indeed, the AHSG has been
known to be strongly guided by the OAU's objective of non-intervention
in member countries' internal affairs, which has been the organization's
attitude towards human rights violations by its members. As a result, the

22.

Wolfang, supra note 9, at 31.
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Charter remedy is ineffective and there is in fact, no remedy within the
Charter. A former Chairman of the Commission summed up the
situation thus:
The enforcement procedure is unsatisfactory. In the absence of a
court and effective measures to a breach, the Charter may well
be a paper tiger except for public opinion that may be whipped
up against the offender. The Commission may investigate, discuss and make recommendations to the states concerned. Do
these include the award of damages, restoration or reparation?
The Assembly can only ask the commission to make in-depth
studies. The Charter does not state that it can condemn an offending state. 23
This obvious inherent lack of effective remedy in the African human
rights mechanism should be corrected by .amending the Charter to
provide for a court without the Commission's limitations and to align
new roles to be performed by the Commission with those to be
performed by the court.
III.

THE NEED FOR A COURT

Critics of the proposition that the African mechanism needs a court often
argue that the idea of a court is not in keeping with traditional Mrican
ways of dispute resolution.
They maintain that mediation and
conciliation are the proper avenues, as mechanisms rooted in African
tradition. 24 The tenability of that argument today remains to be judged
by the realities of present day Africa in light of the ineffectiveness of the
present mechanism under the Charter. Why should traditional African
considerations prevail in the area of human rights? Domestic legal
institutions are not modeled on traditional African ways of dispute
resolution; rather, they duplicate the various legal systems of Africa's
colonial past.
According to Dieng,25 "the delights of traditional
anthropology should not lull us to the point of obscuring reality. Today,
the time has come to accede to the demands of Africans who feel it

23.

U.O. MOZURIKE, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON.HUMAN AND PEoPLES' RIGHTS, Nigerian

Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 25 (1992).
24. Dieng, supra note 6, at 4.
25. /d.
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indispensable for the victims of human rights violations, or their
representatives, to have recourse to judicial process on demand."26
Apart from the traditional African mode of settling disputed questions,
critics may also have another objection, a fear which is common to all
other international mechanisms; that that the values of one legal system
would dominate the court to the subordination or exclusion of other
values. 27 This objection, juridical in nature, has become irrelevant, since
a regional court, like other international mechanisms, would apply
principles of international law, which are based on international customs,
rather than any particular body of common or civillaw. 28 International
law, it has been agreed, involves an amalgam of commonly held values
of all nations, rather than a reflection of the values of anyone particular
legal system or philosophy?9
Another objection that has always been an issue in international law is
that any international mechanism like a court of human rights infringes
upon the national sovereignty of member states.30 Scholars have argued
that one way to remove this fear from members is to provide for an
optional clause similar to article 36 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ)?' Alternatively, two bases of jurisdiction,
compulsory and advisory, have been suggested in order to attract general
membership to an international mechanism.
While it is desirable to attract many state members to an international or
regional mechanism, it should be noted that human rights law should
supersede the notion of national sovereignty?2 Individuals are the
beneficiaries of international human rights law and thus, must be
shielded from abuses of national sovereignty. States must accept that
human rights law is inherently a limit on the scope of state action. For
example, one cannot torture people as a matter of state policy any more
than one can wage aggressive war. In modem international law,
sovereignty does not confer the right to do either. The opinion of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in one of its advisory opinions

26.
/d.
27.
Nanette Dumas, Enforcement of Human Rights Standards: An International Human Rights
Court and Other Proposals, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. Rev. 592 (1990).
28.
[d.
29. [d.
30.
[d. at 593.
31. [d.
32.
[d.
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on the real nature of human rights instruments is persuasive. According
to the court:
[M]odern human rights treaties in general, and the American
Convention in particular, are not multilateral treaties of the traditional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of
rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting states. Their object and purpose is the protection of the basic rights of individual
human beings, irrespective of their nationality, both against the
state of their nationality and all other contracting States. In concluding these human rights treaties, the States can be deemed to
submit themselves to a legal order within which they, for the
common good, assume various obligations, not in relation to
other states, but toward all individuals within their jurisdiction 33
The above quote indicates the importance of the individual in human
rights jurisprudence even though individuals are not per se subjects of
international law. It is even arguable that human rights treaties make
them subjects of international law.
Some scholars of African Human Rights have concluded that a weak
enforcement machinery such as the African Commission was all that was
feasible at the time of the adoption of the African Charter, and would
have made the establishment of a court premature at. that time.
Subsequent establishment of a court would therefore depend on how the
initial organ functioned?4
The current situation in Africa indicates the need for such a court. One
basic question that may arise is whether African states are ready to
cooperate in establishing a court of human rights. That readiness is can
be gleaned from the resolution of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Governmene5 during the Summit of the OAU in Tunis in June 1994, in
which the Secretary General of the organization was called upon to
summon experts to meet on the establishment of an African Court of
Human Rights. Further, the wind of democratization is blowing across
Africa; and the fall of apartheid in South Africa poses a great challenge

33. Inter-Am. C.H.R, Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, Ser. A, No.2, 29 (1982). This opinion is
based on the effect of reservations on entry into force of the American Convention.
34. EZE C. OSITA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: SOME SELECfED PROBLEMS, The Nigerian
Institute of International Affairs in co-operation with Macmillan Nigeria Publishers Ud. 226 (1984).
35. Resolution AHG/230(XXX) June 1994. Supra note 4.
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to African governments to emphasize social justice both at the domestic
and regionalleve1. 36
The present realities of human rights in Africa today make the
establishment of a court invaluable for the following reasons:
First, the protection of human rights under the African Charter and its
institution has not been effectively realized, and will continue as such if
nothing is done. The African Commission as presently structured and
mandated is merely a committee making recommendations to the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of
African Unity, which holds the ultimate word. This procedure has
already subjected the human rights situation in Africa to subjective
political considerations, and has inevitably weakened the position of the
only organ meant for protection functions?7 A sincere effort at
eradicating the shortcomings of the present mechanism will necessarily
entail the establishment of a court, which in tum will involve a
reformulation of the Charter. A question that may arise in this regard is
whether solving the problem necessarily requires a court; whether a
stronger Commission would not solve the problem. However, the basic
issue here is enforcement, a power which may not easily be given to a
commission by member states. Moreover, experience has shown even
within the UN system that a commission does not possess the authority
to issue a binding and enforceable decision.
Second, the experience of other regional counterparts of the African
system has shown that a court is necessary for the articulation of
international legal principles at the regional level. An authoritative
statement of this principles by a judicial organ is needed. These
principles may be articulated either in the court's exercise of compulsory
jurisdiction, or in jurisdiction of an advisory nature. 38 This will
necessarily lead to uniformity in the definition of international human

36. Mandela's South Africa, together with the International Commission of Jurists, is in the
forefront of this new crusade for the addition of a judicial organ to the present African Mechanism.
37. For a detailed discussion of this proposition, see N.S. REMBE, THE SYSTEM OF
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, Institute of Southern African Studies, National University of Lesotho 1
(1991).

38. It could be said that the Inter-American Court achieved its major success in the human
rights situations of Central and Southern American countries from the articulation of international
legal principles under the appropriate instruments primarily by way of advisory opinions. The same
can be said of the International Court of Justice (ICI) and the European Court of Human Rights. A
court in the traditional sense is required to properly articulate and enforce a legal principle,
especially in international law; and particularly in human rights law.
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rights obligations assumed by member states, which in tum will lead to
development of standards in the region concerning other issues that will
come before the court. Such uniformity would create a system fair to
both the defending state parties and the victims, rather than permit
human rights violators to go unpunished 39 as in the present mechanism.
Third, human rights enforcement is likely to be more easily realized with
the establishment of a court than in the present situation. A case coming
before the court will entail publicity, not the confidentiality and secrecy
of the present system. Even where a decision of a court is an advisory
opinion and therefore not binding, it usually attracts far-reaching
pUblicity and promotes compliance~ States are known to have complied
with advisory decisions, either in ending violations of human rights or
adopting laws that follow the opinion of the court.40 In human rights
law, adverse publicity serves as a form of sanction. 41 Condemnation of a
state action by a regional court attaches a serious obligation to state
party, and is therefore more effective in commanding the respect of that
state. Also, domestic courts, especially courts with common law
traditions in Africa, will look to a human rights court for direction and
precedents in their application of human rights instruments at the
domestic level. 42
Fourth and finally, as a regional human rights organ, a court can be an
important instrument in sustaining constitutional democracies and
facilitating the fuifilllment of human rights which are now universally
recognized. 43 Domestic systems ought to be committed to basic values
of the modem international movement such as democracy, humane
government; and the fulfillment of the basic human rights established by
the international system44 but are oftentimes times guaranteed by
domestic constitutions without assurance of protection. A court would
therefore serve as an external check to ensure that democracies follow
the rules.

39.
Dumas, supra note 27. at 585.
40. This has been particularly true in the case of the Inter-American system, where the
exercise of the court's advisory jurisdiction set the ground for enunciating doctrinal principles in
international human rights law as it affects the Americas. For more detail on the advisory jurisdiction
of the Inter-American Court, see Thomas Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American
Human Rights Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. I (1985).
41.
REMBE, supra note 37, at 39.
42. Registered Trustees of the Constitutional Rights Projects v. The President of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria and 2 Others, 3 J. HUM. RTS. L. PRAC. 217 (1993).
43. W. Michael Resiman, Practical Matters For Consideration In The Establishment Of a
Regional Human Rights Mechanism: Lessons From The Inter-American Experience, ST. LoUISWARSAW TRANSATLANTIC LJ. 89 at 100 (1995).
44. Id.
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STRUCTURING THE COURT

A.

COMPOSITION

41

Establishing an African Court of Human Rights would requlfe a
composition that takes into account African geography and legal
traditions. The two basic legal traditions in Africa are the common and
civil law traditions. 45
Geographical considerations should take
cognizance of proportionate representation of African states based on
regions. Consideration of the population density of countries in the
various regions will prove useful in this regard.
The generally accepted regional divisions of Africa include Northern
Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa, Eastern Africa, Western Africa,
and the Islands. There is a greater concentration of countries in the west,
a lesser concentration in the Islands, and a relatively equal concentration
of countries in the other regional divisions. Composing a court based on
population density will also contribute to balancing of legal traditions,
since all the regions tend to have countries with legal systems based on
the common and civil law traditions. The reason for regional rather than
state representation on the court is clear, both for economic and practical
reasons. 46
If composition based on regional representation is acceptable, numerical

representation by region should then be determined. This paper proposes
that the court be composed of thirteen judges, two representing each
region of the Northern, Central, Southern, and Eastern divides, with the
Western region represented by three judges, and the Island region by
one.47 This mode of allocation takes cognizance of the number of
countries that compose the regions. While the west has the largest

45. It should be noted, however, that the notion of personal law is growing to be another legal
tradition in Africa. This class includes customary law, or native law and custom which has become
an integral part of African legal tradition. Sharia law, for instance, is seen as personal law; thus, it is
customary law in areas where common law and civil law are predominant. On the other hand, there
are Islamic States in Africa, where Sharia is the main or major legal tradition. Sharia is believed to
be God's law for the Islamic community, indeed, for all human kind. See JOHN L. ESPOSITO, IsLAM:
THE STRAIGHT PATH 88 (Oxford University Press, 1990.) See also S.G. VESEY-FITZGERALD,
NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE SHARIA IN LAw IN THE MIDDLE EAST 85 (Magidd Khadim and
Herbert J. Libesny, eds., 1955.)
46. Compare this situation with the European mechanism, where each state party is
represented in the European Court of Human Rights through the European Convention on Human
Rights. Africa is made up of fifty three countries. It would generally be impractical to begin a court
with fifty three members.
47. This proposal would be subject to negotiation by member states. While negotiation on
numerical representation may be difficult, it would be reasonable for member states to consider the
concentration of countries in the various regions.
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concentration of countries, the Islands have the smallest concentration.
Further, the composition of thirteen judges would offer the court a good
selection of judges from across the African continent. 48
The court should consist of persons of the highest moral integrity who
have shown demonstrated interest and commitment in the field of human
rights, and with wide-ranging experience and qualifications. 49 This
would ordinarily include qualified lawyers, judges, scholars and
juriconsults. It has been argued that one need not be a lawyer to be
acquainted with human rights, and thus, non-lawyers could be members
of a human rights court. While this may be true, being a member of a
court necessarily involves the articulation of legal principles, which
could be said to be the exclusive preserve of lawyers. It does not follow,
however, that all lawyers are necessarily knowledgeable in human rights
law.
Member countries should ordinarillo make the nominations of who
should compose the court by way of appointment,5l while actual election
should be JIndertaken by the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government of the OAU. 52 Wa Mutua53 is of the view that members of
the court should be proposed by the African Bar Association together

48. Note that under Article 10 of the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, there is a provision to the effect that the court shall consist of eleven judges. Under
Article 11 of the said Protocol, the composition is explained as emphasizing representation of all
regions of Africa and also, adequate representation of women in the court in relation to men.
49.· This is the usual qualification required of judges and other members of international
human rights tribunals or quasi-judicial organs. See specifically American Convention on Human
Rights, art. 52 (1). Compare European Convention on Human Rights, art. 38; and Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, art. 28(2) dealing with the qualification of the members of the Inter-American
Commission, the European Commission and the UN Human Rights Committee respectively.
50. It may be stressed that states may not always nominate members of a regional or
international tribunal. The approach taken under the Statute of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), which uses groups of independent experts to make nominations of members of the court,may
as well serve as a mode of appointing members of the proposed African Court. This mode, it is
argued, may lessen the prospect of nominating poorly qualified persons as political favors. See
Mutua, supra note 7. on his proposal of using the African Bar Association and other national Bars to
make nomination to the African Court.
See specifically Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 4 which provides that members
of the ICJ shall be elected by the UN General Assembly and by the Security Council from a list of
persons nominated by the national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration ... or by national
groups appointed for that purpose by governments, members of the UN not represented in the
Permanent Court of Arbitration.
51. Representing the countries in this case will imply country of origin rather than representing
the interest of the country in question since the members of the court are supposed to serve in their
indi vidual and personal capacities.
52. See Proposed Draft Protocol on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, art. II, 12, and 13 [hereinafter Draft Protocol].
53. Mutua, supra note 7, at 34.
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with the national bar association of the country from which the
candidates originated. This author believes that one of the reasons
behind this view is the need for the court to be an impartial body; a body
without the slightest influence from their home governments. Another
reason is to enhance individuality of each judge to the court. It is
actually desirable to have an independent body with input by the bar of
African countries. It needs to be stated, however, that the political
realities of the situation will require states to be given the opportunity to
nominate candidates, provided the candidates possess the requisite
qualifications and the commitment to break new ground in human rights
enforcement in Africa. States will be very unwilling to relinquish this
function to bar associations at least at the early stages.
B.

BASIC FRAMEWORK

Scholars of African human rights systems have on many occasions
lamented the non-existence of an African Court on Human Rights as
compounding the problem of human rights enforcement in Africa. They
recommend such a court. However, none has suggested any structural
framework. A guess would be that they envisage that the structure of an
African Court of Human Rights should be drawn from such existing
mechanisms in Europe and the Americas and the International Court of
Justice. Indeed, the structure of an African Court should be inspired by
these forerunner institutions, provided the special needs of the African
continent are taken into consideration. 54 Accordingly, the structure to be
developed should be able to withstand the test of time. In other words,
the structure, while focusing on the present, should envisage the volume
of work that the court will have to face in the future, and should aim at
establishing a permanent court as an institution.
The following basic structure should be put in place by way of an
amendment such as the Draft Protocol:
First, with the election of the judges by member states of the OAU
assembled, the judges should be able to elect the officers of the court,
namely, the president and vice president,55 whose duties as well as other

54. The drafters of the Draft Protocol on the African Court for Human and Peoples' Rights
give credence to the fact of drawing inspiration from existing regional and international systems in
the Explanatory Notes to the Draft Protocol.
55. See Draft Protocol, art. 18. Compare African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art.
42(1) with respect to members of the African Commission; Statute of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, art. 12(1); and European Convention on Human Rights, art. 41.
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requirements should be spelled out by the rules of the court which would
be made by the court, as in other regional practices. 56
Second, the functional structure of the court would require a plenary
court and chambers as the need arises. Article 20 of the Draft Protocol
provides for a quorum of seven judges for the court based on its
provision for eleven judges as members of the court; and requires the
establishment of two chambers of five Judges each "if the need arises." It
might be necessary that a separate provision be made in the Protocol for
the establishment of chambers, unless it is envisaged to be a matter
directly within the competence of the court to deal with in its rulemaking
power. 57 In this author's opinion, the two chambers should consist of
five judges each, and judges of the various chambers should be allowed
to rotate based on the number of judges proposed in the composition
subsection above.
When the court is fully established, the majority of cases should be
decided by the various chambers. The plenary court would be invested
with the power of deciding cases of great importance to the
establishment or restatement of important principles of international
human rights law and the interpretation of the African Charter as it
affects the domestic law of member states, or where the court sees it
necessary to overrule itself and depart from its earlier decision. 58
The importance of this procedure cannot be overemphasized. It will
afford a greater sense of direction to domestic courts as to how to apply
their own law, especially for legal traditions that place precedential
emphasis on the decision of a higher court. Further, the plenary court
couldhelp to shape development of the entire system and gain the
confidence of member states, who may ordinarily be reluctant to
recognize the jurisdiction of limited panels of the court.

56. See Article 42 (2) of the African Charter; Article 22 of the Draft Protocol on the African
Charter; Article 55 of the European Convention; and Article 60 of the American Convention on
Human Rights.
57. Article 26 of Protocol!! refonning the European System specifically provides, inter alia,
that the new court shall sit in chambers. However, it appears that under the Statute of the UN
\ Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the issue of chambers was left to the court to organize as the
need arose. This author is of the view that specifically providing for the chambers in the protocol is
preferable to leaving it to the discretion of the court.
58. Under Rule 15 of the Rules of the European Court of Human Rights, a chamber of the
court has discretion to relinquish jurisdiction to the plenary court if a case raises serious issues of
interpretation of the Convention, but must relinquish such jurisdiction in the event of a possible
departure from previous case law. Note that under the new Protocol 11, some of the jurisdiction with
respect to certain matters of the present Plenary Court will be exercised by the new Grand Chamber,
while the new Plenary Court will be involved with administrative matters.
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Third, the court will require a registry or secretariat that will carry out the
administrative aspects of the court's functions. The functions of the
registry will necessarily involve preparing cases, having the relevant
official attend the court's deliberations, and drafting judgments in light
of the deliberations. The registrar should ordinarily be appointed by the
court and not by a political body like the OAU acting through its
secretary general. 59 This is one area where the independence of the court
should be emphasized. With respect to the proposed court, Draft Article
21 (1) of the Draft Protocol tried to correct the defect noticed in the
Charter with regard to the Commission by vesting the court with the
power to appoint its own registrar.
There is no disputing the fact that the registry of the court, like the
secretariat of the Commission, will be dependent upon the OAU for its
budget. The registrar need not be an outsider to the OAU system; rather,
the court should appoint whom it will, including prospective applicants
from the OAU Secretariat. This is essential as a way of emphasizing the
court's independence. Its registry, including the secretariat of the
Commission, should not have the status of an administrative unit of the
OAU. 60 In the case of the present European system, one of the main
reasons why the European Court is vested with the power of appointing
its registrar is that subjecting the registry of the court to the oversight of
the of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe would involve a
political chain of command that would be incompatible with the court's
judicial independence, especially as the registry plays a vital role in the
judicial work of the court. 61

59. For example, with respect to the Secretary of the African Commission, Article 41 of the
African Charter provides that the Secretary General of the OAD shall appoint the Secretary of the
Commission and that he shall provide the staff and the services necessary for the effective discharge
of the duties of the Commission. In the case of the UN Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, it is true
that the UN Secretary General makes the appointment of the Registrar under Article 13 of the Statute
of the Tribunal. That appointment, however, is in consultation with the President of the Tribunal,
who in tum seeks the opinion of the judges. It was the intention of the drafters of the statute to give
the Tribunal a say in the appointment of the Registrar which enhances the independence of the
Tribunal.
60. See Rule Aeneid 12 of the Rules of the European Court under which the Court elects the
Registrar of its registry for a renewable term of seven years, as well as the Deputy Registrar. The
other officials of the Council of Europe are appointed by the Secretary General of the Council of
Europe with the agreement of the President of the Court or Registrar as provided by rule 13. See also
Rule 7(2) of the Rules of the Inter-American court on the election of the Secretary of the Court's
secretariat.
61. MAHONEY AND PREBENSEN, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, in THE
EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 620
(MacDonald et aI., eds., 1993).
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In the European system the registrar is regarded as a member of the
court. 62 This should be duplicated in the African Court in view of the
roles that will be proposed for the court in this paper with regard to the
court's relationship with the existing African Commission. Thus, the
basic framework to be given the court at the beginning should be such
that will enhance the court's independence.
C.

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMMISSION

The establishment of an African Court of Human Rights will definitely
impact the work of the present Commission, and requires clarification of
the functions each of the bodies will perform in the proposed new
mechanism. In this author's view, there are four possible scenarios under
which this relationship can exist. _
The first scenario is similar to the present practice of the Inter-American
system,63 where only a Commission or a member state may present a
case to the court after the Commission completes its consideration of a
petition in accordance with the procedural requirements of the American
Convention. 64 This procedure, it has been argued,65 portends delay,
which may result in a denial of justice to victims of human rights abuse.
It is strongly argued that governments accused of human rights abuses be
given time to respond to complaints filed against them, and at the same
time be free to refer a case to the Court if they are dissatisfied with the
proceedings before the Commission. 66
Yet individuals, as beneficiaries of international human rights law, have
no standing before the court in their own right. Thus, an individual has
no recourse if dissatisfied with the Commission's decision or if the
government fails to comply with the Commission's recommendations. 67
While an individual is given standing before the Commission, he or she

62.

Id.
For a detailed discussion of the Inter-American System, see T. BUERGENTHAL AND DINAH
SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: CASES AND MATERIALS, Revised 4th
Edition (Strasbourg, France: International Institute of Human Rights 1995). See also Dinah Shelton,
The Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Coun of Human Rights, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y
333 (1994); and Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Inter-American Human Rights System: Establishing
Precedents and Procedure in Human Rights Law, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 297 (1995).
64. See the Inter-American Court Decision in the Viviana Gallardo Case of Nov. 13 1981;
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 12, OENSer. A and B No. 0.101181 (1982) where the Court refused a case
submitted by Costa Rica because it was not filed and considered first by the Commission.
65.
See Pasqualucci, supra note 63, at 309.
66.
Id.
67.
/d. at 316.

63.
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is denied access to the court. There needs to be a complete and
reasonable access given to individuals. 68
With respect to an African System, the criticism of the Inter-American
system described above would apply equally, particularly as to individual
standing before the court. Modern human rights law principles, as
developed by the Inter-American and European systems, show that there
is a great need for individuals to have direct access to a human rights
Court. Advocating individual standing before the court is not endorsing
an unrestricted access to every case or potential case.
The second scenario is the one envisaged in the Draft Protocol to the
African Charter. Article 2 of the Draft Protocol, dealing with the
relationship between the Court and the Commission, provides that "the
Court shall complement the protective mandate of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights Conferred upon it by the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights." Draft Article 5 (1)
provides that the Commission, a state party which has lodged a
complaint to the Commission, and a state party against which the
complaint has been lodged at the Commission will have the power to
submit a case to the court. Article 5(2) goes on to provide that when a
state party has a legal interest in a case, it may submit a request to the
court to be permitted to join. Article 7, however, provides for an
additional exceptional jurisdiction:
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 5, the Court may

on exceptional grounds, allow individuals, non-governmental
organizations and groups of individuals to bring cases before the
Court without flrst proceeding under Article 55 of the Charter. 69
(2) The Court will consider such a case, taking into account the
conditions enunciated in Article 56 of the Charter.

68. It may be true that leaving control of the "courthouse door" to the Commission and
governments under the Inter-American system limits the number of cases and allows judicial
resources to be used efficiently. However, it should be stressed that while gate keeping of the
courthouse door is important, it may exclude individuals with meritorious cases, and may some
times be used as a political tool.
69. Article 55(1) & (2) of the African Charter provides that the Secretary of the Commission at
each session shall make a list of communications referred to in Article 56 and transmit them to
members of the Commission, who may read them and submit them to the Commission. Such
communications shall be submitted to the Commission at the request of the simple majority of its
members. It should be noted that the communications referred to here, whose contents and
conditions are explained in Article 56 are those by individuals or organizations rather than states.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000

21

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 6 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 4

48

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW

[Vol. 6: 1

(3) The Court itself may consider the case or refer it to the
Commission.
The combined effect of draft Articles 5 and 7 is that while state parties
and the African Commission have direct access to the court, in
exceptional circumstances individuals, groups of persons, and nongovernment organizations may also go directly to the court without
passing though the commission. Presumably, the court would interpret
the meaning of exceptional circumstances, in which case it may decide
the matter or order that the Commission to consider the matter flrst. This
procedure would need further elaboration as to how it will work. 70
Under this scenario, as one would have expected, there is no drastic
change in the relationship between the African Commission and the
proposed court. It simply modifles the first scenario based on the InterAmerican System by granting individual standing before the proposed
court in exceptional circumstances. Unless there are such exceptional
circumstances, the situation remains the same as under the InterAmerican system. 71 It seems likely that the interpretation of exceptional
grounds will be quite narrow, which will not make this procedure a
popular one. Since human rights violations in African Countries are
rampant, an individual should not be to a finding of exceptional
circumstances before he or she is given standing before the court.
The third scenario would involve the adoption of a procedure similar to
the one under Protocol 9 to the European Convention which introduced
individual standing before the European court.72 This procedure requires
a screening panel of three members of the Court in a case referred by an
individual. This panel determines whether the case raises a serious

70. This is due to the fact that in their explanation the drafters of the Protocol did not state the
details of the dynamics of Article 7. It merely states standing has been granted to individuals and
, international organizations in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter. It may well be
that the court will work it out procedurally in its rules.
71. Note that draft Article 8(2) & (3) of the draft protocol provides that the court will not
consider a matter involving inter-state communication (Article 49 of the Charter) or communications
by individuals or groups (not amounting to exceptional grounds - normal article 55 of the Charter'
provision) until the proceedings before the Commission have been considered and a report prepared
or a decision is made as to each case. This it can be argued is a codification of the rule in the InterAmerican case of Viviana Gallardo, supra note 64, which has been criticized by Pasqualucci. See
Pasqualucci, supra note 63, 309-317.
72. Protocol 9 to the European Convention amends Article 48 of the Convention by providing,
among other things, that the person, non-governmental organization, or group of individuals having
lodged the complaint with the Commission may refer a case to the Court. Note that Protocol 9,
which is optional, was adopted in 1990 and entered into force in 1994. As of 1995, it had been
ratified by seventeen countries.
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question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention.
Where it does not, the panel may, by unanimous vote, decide that the
case shall not be considered by the court,73 in which case it will be
decided by the Committee of Ministers.74 Thus, the screening panel
determines which cases proceed to the court. After the panel has
completed its task, even in cases that it decides should proceed to the
Court, the usual procedures in examining a case referred to the Court are
followed. 75
The procedure introduced by Protocol 9 appears to have influenced the
inclusion of Article 7 of the draft Protocol to the African Charter. The
only difference is that under the draft protocol the complaint need not be
lodged with the African Commission before a person or group of persons
can have standing before the court. The determination of exceptional
grounds will most likely require the same standard as that vested in the
screening panel under Protocol 9, mainly for purposes of controlling the
volume of cases that eventually make it to the court.
Protocol 9 has the shortcoming of not fully realizing that individuals
have been granted standing before the court. It also fails to eliminate the
inherent delay76 in a two-tiered system that does not appear to perform
entirely different functions. These may be some of the reasons that the
European System is undergoing an entire reform with the promulgation
of Protocol 11,77 which eliminates the European Commission and
establishes a Court of Human Rights as the only European Human Rights
institution to deal with matters that were formerly dealt with by two
institutions.
The fourth scenario, which this author espouses, will result in significant
reform of the African Human Rights Mechanism. It WIll entail adapting
the object of the European Reform under its Protocol 11 to the African

73.
74.
75.

Article 5(2), second sub-paragraph.
[d.
See also, D. J. HARRIS ET AL., THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 659, 663 (London: Butterworth 1995).
76. Under the European dual system it took, on average five years and six months (four years
and four months before the Commission, 13 months before the Court) for a case to be decided in
Strasbourg in 1992; in 1993 the average was five years and eight months (four years and four
months before the Commission, one year and three months before the Court). For this and other
characteristics of the new European System, see Andrew Drzemczewski and Meyer-Ladewig,
Principal Characteristics of the New ECHR Control Mechanism as Established by Protocol no. 11
Signed on 11 May 1994, 15 HUM. RTS LJ. 81 at 85 (1994).
77. Protocol 11 is not yet in force. It was opened for signature as of May 11, 1994. According
to its Article 4 the Protocol shall enter into force one year after ail parties to the European
Convention have either ratified accepted or approved the Protocol.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000

23

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 6 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 4

50

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW

[Vol. 6:1

mechanism, while still retaining the African Commission. It will require
assigning distinct functions to the Commission and the Court based on
the need of Africans. Under this framework, the proposed court would
assume a great deal of human rights protection and enforcement, while
the Commission would assume full responsibility for human rights
promotion and negligible aspects of protection. The court should take
over the communication functions of the Commission as well as
maintaining its own adjudicatory functions. Cases should be filed
directly with the Court, whether by individuals, states, or organizations.
The new European mechanism is particularly instructive in the actual
organization of its proposed framework. As in the proposed European
Protocol 11, the proposed African court's registry will communicate with
petitioners and, where necessary, request additional information from the
parties, with the aim of eliminating obviously inadmissible, hopeless and
frivolous applications at the early stage of the proceedings. Where it is
established that a petition makes out a prima facie case, it would be
registered and heard by a chamber. Before the case goes to the chamber,
it should be considered by a screening committee made up of judges,
which should include a judge rapporteur designated for that particular
case. The committee determines whether a petition is admissible
Where a petition is declared inadmissible, the petition is terminated. On
the other hand, a petition that is declared admissible proceeds to a
chamber for consideration on the merits or further questions of
admissibility. The judge rapporteur would normally prepare the case
files and communicate with the parties regarding the procedures. The
chamber should be able to explore and facilitate friendly settlement if
possible, in which case, it sends the case to the Commission to initiate
and follow up on friendly settlemene s within a specified time. Where no
friendly settlement occurs, the chamber proceeds to render a judgment
which could be referred to the plenary court in exceptional circumstances
that raise serious questions on principles affecting the interpretation and
application of the Charter. 79 The plenary court should be in a position to
determine which cases it will accept, which in tum will depend on the

78. This is one area in which the procedure in the proposed African Court will differ from the
European Protocol 11 procedure. Under Protocol 11, exploring and initiating friendly settlement is
the responsibility of the chamber considering the case. Under the African proposal, the Commission
could be involved in protective functions to maintain the sense of neutrality and balance that every
petition requires.
79. The Plenary Court under the proposed African system will combine the power of the
Grand Chamber and the Plenary Court under the European Protocol 11 procedures.
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serious issues of international human rights law involved in the case, and
the need to establish precedent.
The procedure highlighted above should be able to ensure proper
gatekeeping with regard to control of cases that go before the proposed
African Court of Human Rights. In light of the number of petitions that
will come before the court, proper gatekeeping is a genuine concern.
With the African court squarely involved with human rights
enforcement, the African Commission should be able to settle down to
the more traditional work of human rights promotion in its entirety as
envisaged under the Charter, in addition to receiving and considering
state reports. Here the Commission could embark on fact-finding
missions, engage in country studies, issue country reports,80 organize
conferences and seminars, and develop regional human rights
scholarship.
An additional area for the Commission would be advising member states

on aspects of economic, social, cultural, and Peoples' rights that may not
be immediately justiciable, in which the court may not be vested with
subject matter jurisdiction in its adjudicatory functions.
The
Commission should be able to draw from the work of the UN Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in determining the obligations
of member states as they affect the economic, social, cultural and
Peoples' rights provisions of the African Charter. These aspects of the
Charter have received little or no attention in the work of the
This added function presupposes that states will
Commission. 8!
cooperate in their periodic reports to give detailed coverage of all aspects
of the Charter's provisions. 82
The reason for proposing distinct functions for the Commission and the
Court is clear. There is an increase in human rights violations in Africa
for which victims need redress in the form of a court. It is also true that
human rights promotion in Africa has a long way to go. An increase in

80. The American Commission achieved a great deal for human rights in the Americas
through its issuance of country reports. It also enabled the Organization of American States to take
resolutions regarding human rights situations in those countries.
81. The Commission would do well to issue general comments and recommendations in these
areas, as did the UN Committee. It is possible that the recommendation of the Commission in this
regard could lead to progressive development in these areas as envisaged by the Charter.
82. The African Commission has recently introduced the practice of calling upon individual
states to submit their periodic reports in final communiques issued by the Commission; previously,
the communiques had simply made a general call on states which had not yet submitted their reports.
See ANKUMA, supra note 18, at 76
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human rights promotion, along with protection and enforcement by
distinct institutions, will no doubt be a more efficient way of addressing
the human rights situation in Africa.
It could be said that this framework is very ambitious and may not enjoy
popularity with African States in terms of resources and cooperation.
Yet if reform of the African mechanism is necessary, it should be a
proper reform, rather than reaching a compromise as was done under the
Charter. Human rights and other non-governmental organizations need
to embark on spirited lobbying and persuasion of African Governments
and domestic institutions to ensure that an effective mechanism aimed at
addressing the increasing human rights violations evolves in Africa.
V.

EMPOWERlNG THE COURT

A.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of an African Court of Human Rights would encompass
both adjudicatory and advisory functions. The subject matter jurisdiction
of the Court will have an impact on the court's adjudicatory and advisory
functions. These aspects of the court need to be examined.
l.

Adjudicatory Jurisdiction

This is usually referred to as the compulsory or ordinary jurisdiction of a
human rights court or other international tribunal to determine
contentious disputes that come before it on the merits. According to
Judge Piza Escalante83 it is this form of jurisdiction that is likely to be
relied ).lpon most frequently in guaranteeing the rights protected by a
human rights instrument. The main object of a court's contentious
jurisdiction is to rule on whether a state has violated any rights contained
in a particular human rights instrument for which the victim seeks
redress,84 in this case, the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights. The exercise of this jurisdiction by the court will enable it to
apply the instruments and issue a decision on the merits, which may
include the award of reparations or other remedies where the court finds
a violation.

83. In his explanation to his dissenting vote in Viviana Gallardo, supra note 64, before the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
84. SCOTT DAVIDSON, THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 62 (Dartmouth
Publishing Company Limited 1992).
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In both the European and Inter-American Human Rights systems,
member states may have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Courts by declaration. 85 Thus, the use of the courts' contentious
jurisdiction in these systems is optional. Without acceptance of
compulsory jurisdiction, courts cannot hear cases on the merits. The
reasoning behind this practice was to reserve to states some measure of
power based on the notion of sovereignty to decide whether to subject
their actions to the review of an international body.
The draft Protocol on the African Charter is silent on this point with
regard to the proposed African Court. Its Article 3 provides that "the
jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all cases and disputes submitted
to it concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, this
Protocol and any other applicable African human rights instrument." The
reason for this silence is deliberate in the sense that drafters of the
Protocol intend that ratification of the Protocol by member states also
amounts to acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.86
Their decision may also have been influenced by the fact that the African
Charter ,unlike the European Convention, did not make communications
by individuals to the African Commission dependent on the optional
acceptance of this procedure by member states.
Critics of this provision who know the disposition of African states with
respect to human rights may be of the view that this is too ambitious; that
it would be better to have a declaration as to the optional recognition of
the court's compulsory jurisdiction by member states to attract the
requisite ratification that will make the Protocol go into force. On the
other hand, it would appear that the drafters of the Protocol view the
current reforms in regional human rights mechanisms, especially, the
European mechanism, as an opportunity to have a solid human rights
mechanism in Africa, the ratification of which will demonstrate some
measure of seriousness and commitment by the ratifying states.

85. See Articles 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 62(3) of the American
Convention on Human Rights. The change introduced by Protocol 11 to the European Convention
will eliminate this option when the Protocol comes into force. According to the provisions of the
new Article 34 of the European Convention as amended by the Protocol, individual applications may
be received by the court with the High Contracting Parties undertaking not to hinder in any way the
effective exercise of this right by individuals.
86. See the Explanation to the Draft Protocol on the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights at 2.
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Advisory Jurisdiction

The advisory jurisdiction of any international or regional tribunal
involves a formal rendering of legal opinions on issues presented before
it, even though those opinions have no binding legal effect in the form of
requiring positive or negative action from the parties. Even though
advisory opinions are not legally binding, the practice of the InterAmerican Court has shown that it can go a long way to affect the conduct
of states with respect to human rights. The use of advisory opinions is
particularly important in the sense that it may be the only way a court can
have the benefit of looking into an issue involving a state not a party to
the instrument vesting jurisdiction on the merits in the court.
Drawing from the experience of the Inter-American system, this appears
to be particularly important in the Mrican system. 8? Article 4(1) of the
Draft Protocol to the African Charter provides that "at the request of a
member State of the OAU, any of its organs or any organization
recognized by the OAU, the Court may provide an opinion on any legal
matter relating to the Charter or other African human rights instruments."
Subsection 2 gives a judge the freedom to render dissenting opinions.
The practice of the Inter-American system whereby the Inter-American
Court is regarded not just as a Convention organ, but also as an
institution of the Organization of American States (OAS) in matters
relating to human rights,88 will be highly instructive for proposed African
reform. AS an OAU mechanism, the African Charter89 views member
states as parties to the Charter.
The exercise of advisory jurisdiction will also be highly relevant in those
areas of the Charter where the question of justiciability as a result of the
nature of the subject matter may be in doubt. The court may be able to
articulate principles aimed at progressive development of the questions
rmsed.
.
3.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

A probing question arises regarding the substantive rights that the
proposed African court will apply in cases that come before it on the
merits, in view of the fact that the African Charter contmns and

87. For a detailed discussion, see Buergenthal, supra note 40, at L
88. ld.
89. See Article I of the Charter. See also Article 66, which provides for the enacting of special
protocols and the like to supplement the provisions of the Charter.
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guarantees a plethora of rights in the domain of traditional civil and
political rights,90 as well as economic, social, and cultural rights. 91 The
Charter is also innovative in terms of Peoples' and other group rights. 92
The question is whether states will have the right to petition the court for
individuals or group of individuals to perform their duties under the
Charter.
It appears that the framers of the draft Protocol did not address this issue

with regard to the substantive rights jurisdiction of the proposed court. It
could therefore be concluded that they foresee the application of the
Charter as it is. For practical purposes, it is expedient for the Court to
inquire into traditional civil and political rights and those aspects of
economic, social, and cultural rights that could be said to be tangibly
enforceable. 93 Other rights not considered to be tangibly enforceable
could form a substantial aspect of the Court's advisory jurisdiction.
Some of these questions must come before the court before an
appropriate interpretation as to the meaning of the Charter regarding
them can be reached. A court would be equipped to give legal direction
in this regard which could set a standard for other regional and
international systems. As mentioned earlier, this could be an area in
which the African Commission will be effective, especially in seeking
advisory opinions of the Court on the actual meaning of and principles
governing the realization of the economic, social, cultural, and Peoples'
rights aspects of the Charter.
It should be stated that this author believes that social and economic
rights can be realized. They go a long way toward complementing civil
and political rights. This is especially so in developing countries, where
the need to for a conducive atmosphere to realize the basic necessities of
life must be balanced with the need to realize civil liberties. However,
the rampant corruption of the ruling class, whether military or civilian,
especially in Africa in the face of needed economic, social, and cultural
developments complicates the issues.
B.

INDEPENDENCE

The functioning of a regional or international tribunal will require a great
deal of independence in the exercise of its functions. The judges of such

90.
91.
92.
93.

African Charter, art. 3-13.
[d. art. 14-18.
[d. art. 20-24.
Such rights as property rights guaranteed under Article 14.
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tribunals should have attained the professional and moral reputations
required of judges of the highest court of their states of origin. 94 It
follows, therefore, that they should be taken seriously and allowed a free
hand in their job.
The Inter-American system and the European system recognize the
importance of this independence in the various forms it takes. According
to a commentator on the independence of the European Court in making
its rules, "the court has astutely used this rule making competence, which
serves to ensure its collective independence, to fill the gaps in the
Convention.,,95
Further, judges are individually required to be
independent of any influence from home governments or other entities. 96
This serves to emphasize the requirement that judges be selected on the
basis of their individuality.
Another form of independence is the granting of diplomatic immunity to
the judges, as well as immunity from liability for any decisions or
opinions issued in the exercise of their functions .. These principles will
definitely benefit the proposed African system. Article 43 of the African
Charter guarantees such immunity for members of the African
Commission.
The draft Protocol on the African Charter makes elaborate provision for
the independence of judges of the proposed court. In Article 15, which
also has a provision regarding immunity, it is expressly provided that the
"Judges shall be independent in the exercise of their functions. The
Court shall decide matters before it impartially, on the basis of fact and
in accordance with law, without any restriction, undue influence,
inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any
quarter for any reason." This is a pretty strongly worded provision with
an undertone that decries the manipulation that judicial decisions in
Africa have been subjected to.
An Mrican court of human rights needs a great deal of independence for
effective enforcement of human rights. This guarantee of independence
will evoke in the judges the zeal and activism needed to develop the law

94. See Article 52(1) of the American Convention and Article 38 of the European Convention
on Human Rights. See also Article 31 of the African Charter regarding the qualification of the
members of the Commission.
95.
Walter Ganshof van der Meersch, The European Coun of Human Rights, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PuBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw, 193 (Installment 8,1985)"
96. See Rule 4 of the Rules of the European Court. See also Article 71 of the American
Convention.
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in the region, and will ensure the effective exercise of the Court's power
to order provisional measures in cases of extreme gravity and urgency as
required in Article 25 of the draft Protocol. The Inter-American
experience has shown that vesting a human rights court with the power
of ordering provisional remedies can be highly effective. 97
C.

ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS

As noted earlier in this paper, an area in which the present African
mechanism falls short is in the enforcement of any decisions of the
African Commission. It should be recalled that the decision of the
Commission is not binding, nor is the Commission vested with the power
to condemn any state action. Accordingly, states are not under any
obligation to comply with the Commission's recommendations. It thus
falls to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AHSG) of the
OAU to decide the manner of enforcement. 98 It is imperative that for an
African court of human rights to serve its purpose, its decisions on the
merits must be enforced, either by the states ruled against taking positive
action to comply with the decision, or by vesting a body with fewer
political ties in the region with the power to ensure that decisions of the
court are complied with.
In drafting the draft Protocol to the African Charter, its framers knew
there was no effective enforcement mechanism in the Charter and tried to
prevent it with regard to the Court. The draft Protocol provides for an
enforcement mechanism that ranges from making the judgment of the
Court final and not subject to appeal,99 to requiring state parties to
comply with the court's judgment and guarantee its execution in any case
to which they are a party.IOO Further, it provides for the transmission of
the Court's judgment to other member states of the OAU and for the
notification of Council of Ministers to monitor its execution on behalf of
the AHSG.10 1 Finally, it provides for the Court to submit its reports to
regular sessions of the Assembly, specifying cases in which a state has

97. For a detailed analysis of how the Inter-American system has used its provisional measure
power, see 10 M. Pasqualucci, Provisional Measures in the Inter-American Human Rights System:
An Innovative Development in International Law, 26 VAND. 1. TRANSNAT'L L. 803 (1993).
98. See Article 59 of the African Charter. The AHSG, as a political body whose member
governments are the ones complained of, has not been known to have enforced any decision of the
Commission. In addition, nothing in the Charter states that the decision of the Commission is
binding on member states.
99. African Charter, art. 26(4).
100. Id. art. 27.
10 1. Id. art. 28.
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failed to comply with the Court's judgment. 102 These provisions borrow
more heavily from the Inter-American system lO3 with regard to the
process of the enforcement mechanism and take more from the European
system on the use of Council of Ministers to monitor the execution of
judgments. 104
The drafters intended for a victim of a human rights abuse to enforce the
compensation aspect of the judgment in a domestic court, vesting the
Council of Ministers with the power to apply political pressure as well as
taking strong measures against a. state to ensure compliance. If
necessary, the AHSG can ultimately take the same measures. This
framework for enforcement of a human rights system will go far to
ensure the protection of human rights in the region even though, as has
been observed in the European system,105 the Council of Ministers is a
political body that may sometimes allow political considerations to
interfere with its supervisory role.
A problem that remains for Africa is the willingness of member states of
the OAU to realize the "notorious" effect of a report of a state's
noncompliance with the court's judgment, in view of the "sacred"
objective of non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states
enshrined in the Charter of the OAU. On the other hand, it can be said
that the realities of present-day Africa will make the enforcement
framework go far. States now seem willing, no matter the cost, to
publicly condemn human rights violations of member states. 106 There is
no doubt that a wind of change is blowing across Africa, fanned by the
Continent's wish not to be left behind in the new world order of things,
especially in the areas of human rights and democratization, which have
increasingly become the basis of international relations.

102. [d. art. 29.
103. Compare Articles 26(4), 27, 28 and 29 of the draft Protocol with Articles 67, 68(1) and 69
of the American Convention.
104. Note that in the Inter-American system it is the General Assembly of the OAS that is
vested with the power addressing non-compliance with a judgment of the Inter-American Court. For
more details, see Davidson, supra note 84, at 88. Under the European Protocol 11, the Committee of
Ministers retains its power of supervising the execution of the judgment of the European Court.
105. MAHONEY AND PREBENSEN, supra note 61, at 636.
106. Recently, Zambia publicly condemned the terrible human rights situation in Nigeria,
notwithstanding the fact that Zambia paid the price for Nigeria's withdrawal of members of its
Technical Aid Corps working in Zambia.
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FUNDING

It need not be emphasized that a regional human rights system must

provide adequate funding for its enforcement organs if they are to be
effective. Financing international and regional institutions is a huge
issue, especially for an African institution. Member states are known not
to respect their fmancial obligations to the parent regional organs which
set the budgets for these human rights institutions. 107 The defense of
many states opposed to the establishment of human rights institutions has
always been the lack of resources to maintain these institutions. It is not
in doubt that the work of a human rights court in Africa will require
enormous financial resources. Staff lawyers must be hired to process and
assist the court with basic legal analysis of the cases, judges must be
paid, and the necessary infrastructure must be in place.
Since a lack of financial resources can be a reasonable argument against
a court, it will take strong political will to establish and financially
sustain a court. If African states are determined to meet their financial
obligations to the OAD, there is no doubt that a court will be established
and gradually sustained. Judges need not begin on full-time basis. lOS It
can also argued that prioritizing regional spending can help the financial
situation of the regional organ. In 1991, the OAD promulgated the
African Economic Treaty which provides for the Establishment of an
African Court of Justice. The treaty aims at African economic
integration and unity. Also, the African Charter on the Rights of the
Child provides for a Committee that will perform a similar function,
though particular to that Charter, as the African Commission does in
respect of the African Charter. These other mechanisms are equally
important. Africa needs economic integration and unity as much as it
needs human rights enforcement. There still needs to be proper fiscal
diScipline in the face of scarce resources. The commitment of the richer
African countries should be directed to uplifting the region rather than to
elevating domestic corruption to the level of an industry.
In the opinion of this author, all that is required is the determination of

African states to take the bold step in this direction. Donor agencies and
other international development institutions under the auspices of the

107. Under Article 41 of the African Charter the OAU sets the budget of the African
Commission.
108. It would be expedient, however, for the president of the court to serve full time to ensure
effective coordination of the activities of the court. See Article 18(2) of the draft Protocol to the
African Charter on the establishment of an African Court.
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United Nations should in tum lend a helping hand. The possible political
implication of such aid is apparent. On the other hand, it is a truism that
human rights has become everyone's concern. The international
community could demonstrate its concern for human rights in Africa by
helping in this regard.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Resolution of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of
the OAU at its summit in Tunis in June 1994 requesting the Secretary
General of the OAU to convene a government experts' meeting to
consider, in conjunction with the African Commission, the means to
enhance the efficiency of the Mrican Commission and to consider the
establishment of an Mrican Court of Human and Peoples' Rights, is the
beginning of a new era in African human rights jurisprudence. In the last
few years, the African Commission has begun to find its way by using its
implied powers to address some of the human rights situations in Africa.
It could be argued that this resolution is indicative of the inadequacy of
the present mechanism under the Mrican Charter.
It has been the goal of this paper to demonstrate that an African Court of
Human Rights that genuinely draws on the experiences of the European
and Inter-American systems will enhance the protection of human rights
in Africa. A court can make a great difference in human rights
enforcement. The psychological effect of an international court's
judgment on a state is critical. The stage has been set by the resolution
of the AHSG and the subsequent meeting of government experts in
South Africa in 1995 which came up with a draft Protocol to the African
Charter. The draft Protocol will need further refinement to realize its
potential in light of the reforms proposed by this paper.
This paper has shown that while the exercise of implied power may be
desirable, it may not go far enough if challenged. The challenge will
come not before a court of law, but in the blatant refusal of a state to
comply with the Commission's bidding. A decision by the Commission
is not binding, and has never been enforced by any regional entity. A
better solution is to increase the Commission's effectiveness in
functioning under the reforms proposed by this paper. Therefore, a
complete reform of the present African mechanism is necessary to
promote, protect, and enforce human rights in Africa.
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